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I.
Widely acclaimed as the first genuine philosopher in the Islamic
Tradition,1 Abu YusufYa'qub b. Ishaq al-Kindi (c.801-c.873) is a significant
figure in the history of natural theology, having formulated what is perhaps
the earliest statement of the argument for God's existence based on the
creation of the universe ex nihilo.2 Deeply committed to the doctrine of
creation found in the Qur'an, al-Kindi rejected the Aristotelian belief in
the eternity of the universe and matter; accordingly, he attempted to
demonstrate philosophically that the universe began to exist a finite time
ago, and therefore that there must have been a Creator who brought the
universe into being out of nothing. For al-Kindi, the temporal origination
of the universe strictly implies the creation of the universe.3
1See, forexample, the statements tothis effect inWilliam Craig, The CosmologicalArgument
fromPlato to Leibniz (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 61; Ahmed Fouad El-Ehwany, "Al-
Kindi,"inAHistory ofMuslim Philosophy, ed. M. M. Sharif(Wiesbaden:Otto Harrassowitz,
1963),p. 429; MajidFakhry, A Historyof IslamicPhilosophy, 2nded. (NewYork: Columbia
University Press, 1983),p. 66; Kevin Staley, "Al-Kindi on Creation: Aristotle's Challenge
to Islam," Journal ofthe History ofIdeas 50 (1989): 355.
2SeeMajid Fakhry, "TheClassical Islamic Arguments fortheExistence of God," Muslim
World 47 (1957): 140.According to GeorgeAtiyeh, the argument from creation is the "most
important argument for God's existence in the philosophyof al-Kindi" (George N. Atiyeh,
Al-Kindi: The Philosopher of the Arabs [Rawalpindi: IslamicResearchInstitute, 1966], p.
49).
3Theterm 'ibda' isemployed byal-Kindi todesignate thetemporal creation oftheuniverse
ex nihilo. Although 'ibda' does not have this meaning in the Qur'an, and although later
philosophersused this term to refer to a kind of Neoplatonic 'eternal creation', nevertheless
"there can be no doubt that al-Kindi... gave to 'ibda' this meaning of a temporal creation
from nothing" (Richard Walzer, "New Studies on Al-Kindi," in Richard Walzer, Greekinto
Arabic: Essays onIslamic Philosophy, Oriental Studies [Oxford: BrunoCassier, 1962], p.
189).
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Thus, al-Kindi's doctrine of creation turns on whether or not it can be
demonstrated that the universe had abeginning in time. The most complete
treatment ofthis question is found inal-Kindi's treatise On First Philosophy *
There headvances three arguments infavour of the temporal origination of
the universe. In this paper, I shall beconcerned only with the first of these,
namely, the argument based on the necessary concomitance ofbody, motion,
and time. I shall argue that it does not appear tosuccessfully establish that
theuniverse began toexistin tempore. Inthecourse of discussion, however,
it willbecomeclear thatIamnotpersuaded that recent settheoretic criticisms
of this argument are cogent. My conclusion, nevertheless, will be that one
isnot rationally justified ininferring that the universe was created by God
ex nihiloin the finite past on the basis of this argument.
II.
Al-Kindi begins his discussion in On First Philosophy by laying out
six principles which he considers "true first premises."* They are, saysal-
4Ya'qub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi, Al-Kindi's Metaphysics: ATranslation ofYa'qub ibn Ishaq al-
Kindi's Treatise 'On First Philosophy', with anIntroduction and Commentary byAlfred L.
Ivry (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1974), pp.67-75. Forarguments
similar tothese seeal-Kindi's related epistles translated inN.Rescher andH.Khatchadourian,
"Al-Kindi's Epistle on theFinitude of theUniverse," Isis57 (1966): 426-433; F.A. Shamsi,
"Al-Kindi's Epistle onWhat Cannot BeInfinite andof What Infinity May BeAttributed,"
Islamic Studies 14 (1975): 123-144.
5Al-Kindi, in"On First Philosophy" 114.13, p. 68. Although al-Kindi does not explicitly
defend these principles in On First Philosophy, proofs for the truth of principles (1), (4),
and(5)maybe found in hisepistle "OnTheExplanation of theFinitude of the Universe."
SeeRescher, op. cit., pp. 429-431. Ivry contends that these principles areproved "incircular
fashion" (Alfred Ivry, "Commentary to 'On FirstPhilosophy'," inAl-Kindi's Metaphysics:
ATranslation ofYa'qub ibnIshaq al-Kindi's Treatise 'On First Philosophy' [Albany, N.Y.:
StateUniversity of New York Press, 1974], p. 147). I think Ivryis correct. Forexample, al-
Kindi's proof for the first principle can be set out as follows:
(i) ~ [(A> B) v (B> A)] AspforCP
(ii) ~(A>B)&~(B>A) (i)DM
(iii) A * B Asp for RAA
(iv) (A * B) z> [(A > B) v (B > A)] Premise
(v) (A > B) v (B > A) (iii), (iv) MP
(vi) ~(B>A) (ii)Simp
(vii) A > B (v), (vi) DS
(viii) ~ (A > B) (ii) Simp
(ix) A = B (iii)-(ix) RAA
(x) ~ [(A > B) v (B > A)] z> (A = B) (i)-(ix) CP
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Kindi's modern-day commentatorAlfred Ivry, "thought with no mediation,"
that is, "as intellectual intuitions, free of prior logical, as well as physical,
mediation."6 Letting '>' stand for "is greater than", '<' for "is smaller than",
and '=' for "is equal to", Al-Kindi's six self-evident first principles can be
conveniently summarized as follows:
(1) For any bodies A and B, if it is not the case that
either (A > B) or (B > A), then A = B.
(2) For any bodiesA and B, if A = B, then the dimensions
between the limits ofA and the dimensions between
the limits of B are equal in potentiality and actuality.
(3) Finite = df not infinite.
(4) For any bodies A, B, and C, if A = B and C is added
to B, then BC > B, and therefore BC > A (where BC
is the body resulting from the addition of B & C).
(5) For any bodies A and B, if A and B are finite, then if
A and B are joined, the resultant body AB will be of
finite magnitude.
(6) If A and B are genetically related things - that is,
things falling under a single genus (e.g., the genus
of magnitude) - then if A < B, then eitherA is inferior
to B or a portion (part, segment) of B.
A word of explanation should be said concerning the terms used in these
principles. With regard to the term 'body', it seems clear that al-Kindi here
employs 'body' to denote thisor that body; that is, certain particular bodies,
primarysubstancesin theAristotelian sense.7 This is borne out by the fact
(Here 'A' and 'B' standforparticular bodies, and '>' represents the 'greaterthan' relation.)
It will benoticed that theconclusion - i.e., (x)- appears in transposed form instep(iv); the
argument is circular. But this does not mean that is question-begging, any more than the
Law of Non-Contradiction is question-begging because at some pointin anyargument for
its truth that very law will be invoked.
6 Ibid.
7Recall that for Aristotle aprimary substance isthat 'which isneither asserted ofasubject
norpresentin a subject' (e.g., thismanor this horse). SeeAristotle, Categories, 2.a. 12-15.
We must becareful topoint out, however, that al-Kindi also uses 'body'torefer tothegenus
of body, one of the various genera falling under the single genus of magnitude. "... the
genusof bodyhood is met with in all bodies, but is not met with in lines and surfaces [the
othergenera ofmagnitude]" (Rescher, "Al-Kindi's Epistle on theFinitude of theUniverse,"
p. 428).
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that in his epistle On The Finitude of The Universe, he remarks that by
'body' is meant "that which has length and breadth and depth."8 And here
it should be noted that length, breadth, and depth fall under Aristotle's
category of quantity; they are attributes of a primary substance, e.g., this
body orthis man. Moreover, inOn First Philosophy, al-Kindi says that "a
body has genus and species," and hecompares bodies with "other objects
which have quantity and quality."9 Genus and species, of course, are
universals orsecondary substances inAristotle's sense, being predicated of
a subjectbut not inhering in it. So, forexample, in the sentence"John is a
man", the speciesor universal 'man' is predicated of John, an individual
man.10
A second term requiring explanation here is'magnitude', which appears
inprinciples (5) and (6). Al-Kindi's use of this term indicates that magnitude
is, first of all, a genus (i.e., a secondary substance), for it is said to be
"(predicated) of body,"11 and is "met with in the line and the surface and
the body,"12 since it is the single genus under which these various genera
fall. Magnitudes are, furthermore, composed of parts and are therefore
multiple.13 Moreover, thecontinuous magnitudes of body, area, line,place,
and time "have dimensions and limits" in addition to being"divisible and
separable."14
III.
Havinglaidout his six self-evidentprinciples, al-Kindinext invites his
reader to consider a body of infinite magnitude. A body, as a continuous
magnitude, is necessarily separable into its parts,15 and therefore the idea
ofa finitemagnitudebeingsubtracted orseparated fromit canbe entertained.
Now, according to al-Kindi, the body remaining after such a separation
8 Ibid.
9Al-Kindi, "On First Philosophy," 114.8-10, p.68.
10 SeeAristotle, Categories, 2.a. 14ff.
1• Al-Kindi, "On First Philosophy," 151.12, p. 102.
12 Rescher, "Al-Kindi's Epistle on theFinitude of the Universe," p.428.
13 Al-Kindi, "On First Philosophy" 157.5, p. 109.
14 Ibid., 158.7, p. 110.
15 It isperhaps worth pointing out that none ofthe continuous magnitudes ofbody, area,
line, place, or time is divisible in potentiality or actuality into another species. Thus, for
example,a divisionof a bodyisbody(157.10), andeachsectionof a body"bears itsdefinition
and its name" (Ibid., 157.18, p. 109).
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will be either finite or infinite. But it cannot be finite. For if the finite
(separated) body is added back to the remainder, the resulting body will be
finite. Why so, exactly? Principle (5) states that when two bodies of finite
magnitude are joined, the resulting body will also be finite in magnitude.
In this case, however, the body formed from adding back the finite
(separated) body to the remainderconstitutes the same body from which
the original separation was made - that is, the body of infinite magnitude.
Thus, the resulting body is both finite and infinite in magnitude. And this
contradicts principle (3) - thefinite is not the infinite - which is just a
substitution instance of A is not non-A. So the body remaining after the
separation of a finite magnitude cannot be finite.
Perhaps an example will be helpful in bringing al-Kindi's reasoning
into clearer focus. Let AB be a body of infinite magnitude. Suppose, then,
that A, a body of finite magnitude, is separated from AB. The resulting
body B cannot be finite. For suppose that it were. Then, by principle (5),
the addition of A (a finite body) to B (also a finite body) could only yield
the finite body AB. But this contradicts the original assumption that AB is
a body of infinite magnitude. Hence, it is impossible that B, the body
resulting from the separation, be finite.
Is it possible, on the other hand, for B to be infinite? It is not, says al-
Kindi. For suppose that it were infinite. Then the finite (separated) body A,
when added back to B, would result in a body (AB)' such that either (AB)'
would be greater than the original (infinite) body AB or (AB)' would be
equal to body AB. But the former alternative is clearly false, since if it were
true that (AB)' > AB, then one infinite body would be greater than the
other. By principle (6), therefore, the smaller infinite AB would be inferior
to the greater infinite (AB)' or to a portion of it. Thus, AB would be equal
to a portion of (AB)'. If so, however, then AB would be finite; for it would
be equal to a finite portion of (AB)' and, accordingto principle (2), equal
bodies possess limits whose dimensions are equal in actuality and
potentiality. But this contradicts the original supposition that AB is a body
of infinite magnitude; it is false, therefore, that (AB)' > AB.
But the second disjunct is also false, namely, that (AB)' = AB. Recall
that the separation of finite body A from an infinite magnitude AB is an
initial assumption of the argument. It is further being supposed that the
remaining body B is infinite in magnitude, and that (AB)' is the body
resulting from the addition of A (a finite body) and B (an infinite body). To
claim that (AB)' = AB, therefore, is to assert that a body can be added to
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another body without increasing it. But this is contradictory; for it implies
that the whole (i.e., AB)' is equal to one of its parts (i.e., B).^
If sound, what al-Kindi's argument demonstrates is that no body of
infinitemagnitudecan exist.For if there werea bodyof infinitemagnitude,
then if a body of finite magnitude were separatedfrom it (and magnitudes
are necessarily separable into their parts), then the remaining body would
be either finite (alternative #1) or infinite (alternative #2). Both of these
alternatives lead to contradiction. Therefore,it can be legitimatelyinferred
that no body of infinite magnitude can exist.
IV.
Before proceeding with al-Kindi's argument further, it will be useful to
pause and examine an objection to his reasoning arising from modern set
theory. In arguing against alternative #1, al-Kindi must suppose that the
subtraction of a finite body from a body of infinite magnitude yields a
finite remainder. This is a false supposition according to the deliverances
of modern set theory. Axiomatic set theory states that an actually infinite
magnitudecomprisesa set whosemembers are actually infinite in number.
The symbol So (aleph nought) denotes the cardinality or number of
members of an actually infinite set. Now a peculiar property of infinite sets
is that "one can add or subtractdenumerably many members from [theml
andnotchangethenumberof members intheset."17 Foranyactually infinite
set, therefore, So - n = So and So + n = So (where n is any natural
number).1» It is therefore a mistake to claim, as al-Kindi does in arguing
against alternative #2, that it is impossible to add to a bodily magnitude
withoutincreasingit.For this is to supposethatEuclid's Maxim- the whole
is greaterthan itspart - appliesto infinitemagnitudes; it doesnot. Concerning
Euclid's Maxim, F.A. Shamsi comments:
16 Craig points out that al-Kindi refutes the second disjunct, not by appealing to principle
(4), but rather by "utilising a principle that should have been added to his six: the whole is
greater than [its] part" (Craig,Plato toLeibniz, p. 69).This principle, also known as Euclid's
Maxim,can bederiveddirectlyfromprinciples(2), (4),and(6),and indirectlyfromprinciple
(1). See Ivry, "Commentary to 'On First Philosophy'," p. 150.
17 J.P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1987), p.21.
18 An interesting implication ofthese theorems is that "there isthe same number of points
ina one-inchlineas thereis inall of infinitespace"(WilliamCraig, The Kalam Cosmological
Argument [London: Macmillan, 1979], p. 80).
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Insofar as finite magnitudes are concerned, the postulate
is true of them — the (proper) part must necessarily be
less in magnitude than the whole. But the postulate fails
when infinite magnitudes are taken into consideration... it
is obvious that a finite subtraction from an infinite
aggregation or magnitude cannot render that aggregation
or magnitude finite.19
Here Shamsi is exploiting a second unique property of an infinite set, namely,
that it has a denumerable subset (where a set is denumerable just in case it
can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with one of its proper subsets).
Consider, for example, two infinite sets:20 the set of all natural numbers
{1,2,3,...} and the set of all even natural numbers {2,4,6,...}. Since these
two sets are actually infinite, the members of {1,2,3...} can be placed in a
one-to-one correspondence with the members of {2,4,6,...}. Yet although
the set of even natural numbers is a part of the set of natural numbers, they
both have, according to infinite set theory, a cardinality of So. Therefore,
if the Principle of Correspondence validly applies to infinite sets, it follows
that part of the set of natural numbers is equivalent to the whole set of
natural numbers, a conclusion obviously at odds with Euclid's Maxim.
There is, therefore, a dilemma to be faced: If there were a body of
infinite magnitude, then either the maxim that "the whole is greater than its
parts" would apply to it or not. Now if the maxim applies, then al-Kindi's
reasoning is vindicated, from which it follows that no infinite magnitude
can exist. If, on the other hand, it does not apply (the Principle of
Correspondence applying instead), then a body of infinite magnitude
possibly exists, in which case al-Kindi's argument fails.
But is thereany reasonto thinkthat the Principleof Correspondence is
applicable to infinite magnitudes? The answer, I think, is that there is not.
For if it wereapplicable, then it would be possiblefor metaphysically absurd
states of affairs to obtain. Consider the following example due to al-
Ghazali.21 Jupiter revolves once every twelve years, while the sphere of
19 Shamsi, "Al-Kindi's Epistle onWhat Cannot Be Infinite and ofWhat Infinity May Be
Attributed," p. 125
20 .The example isCraig's. See Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, p. 73.
21 Al-Ghazali, Tahafut al-Falasifah [Incoherence ofthe Philosophers], trans. Sabih Ahmad
Kamali (Lahore: PakistanPhilosophical Congress, 1958), p. 20.
8 AUSLEGUNG
the fixed starsrevolves everythirty-six thousand years.Nowif the universe
wereeternal (and neverbegan toexist), thenaccording to infinite set theory
the set of revolutions of Jupiterand the set of revolutions of the sphereof
the fixed stars would be equal, thecardinality of both setsbeing So. But
surely this is absurd. For the number of revolutions of Jupiter would be
thousands of timesgreaterthan that of the sphere of the fixed stars if the
universe were eternal. The application of thePrinciple of Correspondence
totheexistence ofanactual infinite yields results which aremetaphysically
absurd. But,asCraighaspointed out,22 necessarily, wereanactually infinite
magnitude to exist,theneitherthe whole magnitude would be greaterthan
anyof its parts or it wouldnot. (Thisis guaranteed by the Law of Excluded
Middle.) Ineithercase, however, there are attending absurdities; theproper
courseofaction, therefore, would seemtobe todenytheexistence of infinite
magnitudes. Thus, itseems tomethatinfinite settheory poses noinsuperable
obstacle to al-Kindi's argument.
V.
Al-Kindi next attempts to showthat the universe is both spatially and
temporally finite. It is a necessary truth that body falls under the genus of
magnitude. Furthermore, any magnitude is necessarily separable into its
parts. But, by definition, whatever is necessarily separable into its parts is
quantitative. So body is necessarily quantitative. Moreover, if, as al-Kindi
argues, it is impossible that a body of infinite magnitude should exist (see
section III above), then letting 'Q' stand for "is quantitative", T for "is
infinite", and 'b' for "body", it follows that
(7) ~0(Qb&Ib),
or alternatively,
(8) Q(Qb=>~Ib).
This may be granted. But how does al-Kindi propose to bridge the gap
between (8) and the claim that the universe is temporally finite? Here he
22 SeeWilliam Lane Craig, "Time and Infinity," International Philosophical Quarterly 31
(1991): 395.
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makes two closely related points. First, he points out that time is a continuous
magnitude and is therefore divisible and separable into its parts. Thus, he
says, time is necessarily quantitative. This is certainly correct. But does it
follow that time is finite? As far as I can see, it does not unless, of course,
it is also true that
(9) (Vx)Q(Qx3~Ix).
But the problem is that the inference from (8) to (9) is invalid. It has the
form: • Fa -> (Vx) • Fx. And this modal principle has false instances. For
example, if 'a' is "me" and 4F' is "is a person", then if '• Fa -> (Vx) •
Fx' is a correct modal principle, if I am essentially a person, everything is
essentially a person, which is patently false.
The difficulty, then, is that from the fact that time is quantitative it
follows that time is finite only if somethinglike (9) is true. Unfortunately,
al-Kindi never provides an argument for (9); he argues only for (8), which
does not entail (9).
Secondly,al-Kindi points out that since an actually infinitebody cannot
exist, the body of the universe cannot be infinite. But, he says,
Things predicated of a finite object are also of necessity,
finite. Every predicate of a body, whetherquantity, place,
motion or time ... and the sum of everything which is
predicated of a body in actuality, is also finite, since the
body is finite.2*
For al-Kindi, time is the durationof the body of the universe,and the body
of the universe is finite; therefore, time is finite.
But the question at once arises: How can it be shown that time is the
duration of the body of the universe? Al-Kindi's argument shows that the
bodyof the universe is temporally finiteonly if bodyand time are necessary
concomitants - only if, that is, • (B = T). How is this to be proved? Well,
since time is the "number of motion,"24 motion and time are necessary
concomitants; it is impossible (by definition) that either motion or time
occur without the other. Thus, • (M = T). If it could be established that
23 Al-Kindi, "On First Philosophy" 116.10 ff, p.70,emphasis added.
24 Ibid., 117.5, p. 70.
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motion and body were necessary concomitants as well, it could easily be
shown that • (Bs T).This isprecisely what al-Kindi attempts todo. He
first argues that motion can never existwithout abody, that is, that ~ 0 (M
& ~B), orequivalently, • (M z> B). Motion is a species of change, and
change isalways the change of some thing; for "change isacounting of the
duration of the body."25 It is therefore necessarily the case that if motion
exists, body exists.
Al-Kindi goes onto argue that • (B d M). Here twomajor arguments
are advanced. Regarding the first, William Craig remarks that it is"poorly
reasoned."26 One is inclined to agree with him onthis point. According to
al-Kindi, body is necessarilysuch that if it exists, then either motion exists
or motion does not exist. That is,
(10) • [B z> (M v ~M)].
But it is obvious from senseperception thatbodiesexist.27 Hence,
(11) • [(B & M) v (B & ~M)].
The first disjunct in (11) is, of course, what Kindi wants to affirm, since it
yields his desired result, namely, that the existence of body entails the
existence of motion. What is required, then, is an argument for the denial
of the second disjunct in (11).
Suppose for reductio, therefore, that B &~M is true; that is,that body
existsbutmotion does not. NowB &~Mentails ~M,which, inconjunction
with the logical truth ~ 0 M v 0 M, strictly implies
(12) (~M & ~ 0 M) v (~M & 0 M).
But to claim that motion does notexist, noteven possibly so, is certainly
contradictory, says Kindi. Forthe first disjunct of (12) tells us that motion
does not exist. However, it is evident from sense-perception that bodies
exist. However, since "body exists, motion is an existent."28 It follows,
25 Ibid., 117.12-13, pp.70-71.
26 Craig, Plato toLeibniz, p. 117.
27 "... appeal tofact within a logical proof istypical ofthe type ofargument al-Kindi uses'
(Ivry, "Commentary to 'On First Philosophy'," p. 155).
28 Al-Kindi, "On First Philosophy," 117.15, p.71.
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therefore, that ~M & ~ 0 M implies that motion existsand motion does not
exist; thus, the first disjunct of (12) is necessarily false.
Unfortunately, there are two major defects in this proof. First, it appears
that al-Kindi has begged the question at issue. It will be recalled that Kindi
has already shown that • (M z> B). Now he is in the midst of a proof that
will establish that • (B zj M), his ultimate goal being to show that body
and motion are necessary concomitants. Thus, Kindi cannot assume B Z)M
in order to argue against the first disjunct of (12). This is question-begging,
since (12) is itself a premise in the argument being advanced in support of
the truth of Q(B=>M).
Secondly, the inference of (11) from (10) and the proposition bodies
exist is modally invalid; for bodies exist is only contingently (and not
necessarily) true. If it were necessarily true, then the universe would be
eternal, a conclusion obviously at odds with al-Kindi's philosophy. And if
it were only contingently true that bodies exist, then it would follow that (B
& M) v (B & ~M) was only contingently true as well. This is somewhat
problematic. For then even if al-Kindi were able to show that B & ~M was
necessarily false, he would only be able to conclude that B & M was
contingently true. But then B 3 M could only be contingently true, leaving
open the possibility that B & ~M. Thus, even if motion and time were
necessary concomitants, it would still be possible that body and time were
not. On this scenario, then, even if it were impossible for the universe to be
spatially finite, it would still be possible for it to be temporally infinite.
Though not devastating to al-Kindi's argument, this finding does contradict
his claim that motion and body are necessary concomitants.
In any event, al-Kindi goes on with a refutation of the second disjunct
of (12). That disjunct says that as a matter of fact motion does not exist, but
nevertheless that it is possible that it does exist in some body. In order to
show that ~M & 0 M is contradictory, Al-Kindi nowreasonsthat if a body
exists and motion possibly exists in some body, then "motion necessarily
exists in some bodies."2^ But why so? "That which is possible," he contends,
"is that which [actually] exists in some possessors of its substance."30 Thus,
for example, the art of writing is a possibility (though not an actuality) for
the Prophet because it (does) exist in some other man. In commenting on
this passage, Ivry points out that al-Kindi accepts "the priority of actuality
29Ibid., 118.4, p.71.
30 ibid.
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to potentiality,"31 and therefore that something is possible only if it is
actualized in some othermember of the species. Indeed, laterin On First
Philosophy, al-Kindi remarks,
Everything which belongs potentially tosomething can be
brought to actuality only by another thing. That which
brings something from potentiality to actuality is itself in
actuality.32
To be sure, if the possibility of motion exists in some body, then in order
for that possibility tobe actualized, something must bring ittoactuality. In
this sense, actuality isprior topotentiality. But itdoes not follow/raw what
al-Kindi has said here that athing is possibly inmotion only if some other
memberof the same speciesis actually in motion.
Again, the difficulty here is a modal one. From B & 0 M it follows that
0 M, that is, that motion possibly exists in some body. Should we conclude
from this (along with al-Kindi) that motion necessarily exists in some body?
Surely not. What follows from 0 M isnot • M, but only • 0 M,33 that is,
that the possibility of motion necessarily exists in some body or another.
But • 0Mdoes not entail M, which itmust ifal-Kindi's argument is to go
through.
Al-Kindi's conclusion, nonetheless, isthat since motion possibly exists
in some body, it actually exists in some body. However, from the second
disjunct of (12) - that is, from ~M & 0 M - it can be deduced that motion
does not exist. Andsince, for al-Kindi, 0 Mentails • M (and soM), it can
also be deduced that motion does exist. Hence, ~M & 0 M implies that
motion exists and motion does not exist. This is flatly contradictory; thus,
the second disjunct of(12) isalso necessarily false. Now since both disjuncts
of (12) are necessarily false, it follows that (12) is as well. But recall that
(12) is entailed by (B & ~M) and (~ 0 M v 0 M). Therefore, if (12) is
necessarily false, then either (B&~M) or(~0 Mv 0 M) isalso necessarily
false. Since - 0 M v 0 M is an instance of the Lawof Excluded Middle, it
follows that
31 Ivry, "Commentary to 'On First Philosophy'," p. 155.
32 Al-Kindi, "On First Philosophy," 155.3-5, p. 106.
33 The inference from 0pto • 0pis the characteristic formula ofthe S5 system ofmodal
logic. S5 has commended itself tomost philosophers oflogic as the system that best captures
ournotions of possibility, impossibility, and necessity. The inference from 0 p to• p is
invalid in Feyes' system T and the Lewis systems S4 and S5. See Kenneth Konyndyk,
Introductory Modal Logic (Notre Dame: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1986), pp. 31-55.
TIME, INFINITY, AND THE CREATION OF THE UNIVERSE 13
(13) Q~(B&~M).
And (11) and (13) jointly entail
(14) • (B 3 M)
which is what al-Kindi set out to prove.
The second major argument advanced for the conclusion that body
cannot exist without motion is couched in an objection entertained by al-
Kindi. Perhaps the body of the universe was originally at rest (from eternity)
and then, since it had the possibility ofmotion, subsequently began to move.
If sound, this objection would undercut creatio ex nihilo; for the body of
the universe would then be eternal and would never have begun to exist.34
Suppose that this is indeed the case, says al-Kindi; that is, suppose the
universe was eternally at rest but then subsequently moved. Then the body
of the universe would either have been generated from nothing or it would
be eternal. If the former alternative is true, then the very generation of the
body of the universe would be a motion, since generation is a species of
motion.35Accordingly, at no time t would the body ofthe universe be found
to be existing without motion; hence, it would not be the case that body
precedes motion. By hypothesis, however, body does precede motion.
Hence, body both precedes and does not precede motion. Consequently,
even if the body of the universe were generated from nothing, body would
not precede motion.
There is, I think, one serious problem with this argument; it assumes
that the generation of the body of the universe is a motion, a species of
change. But is this really the case? I do not think so. To begin with, change
is always change from a prior state to a later state; al-Kindi has already
established that motion (change) and time are necessary concomitants, so
that motion (change) entails the existence of temporally prior states.
Furthermore, change is always the change (over time) of some thing. This
is evident from al-Kindi's observation that if motion exists, body exists.
34 Thiswould not,however, "exclude thepossibility thatthere existsa personal beingwho
initiates the temporal series of events into a quiescent universe" (William Craig, "The Kalam
Cosmological Argument and the Hypothesis of a Quiescent Universe," FaithandPhilosophy
8 [1991]: 106). A recent proponent of the objection al-Kindi entertains is Stewart Goetz.
See his "Craig's KalamCosmological Argument," Faithand Philosophy 6 (1989): 99-102.
35 Al-Kindi, "On First Philosophy" p.71.
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Now the creation (generation) of the body of the universe out of nothing
implies two things: (i) there is no timeprior to creation,3^ and (ii) no bodies
existpriortocreation. Butif,asal-Kindi claims, thegeneration ofthebody
of theuniverse isa motion orchange, then there is (ofnecessity) both time
and body prior to creation. Thus, al-Kindi's argument here is doubly
contradictory; it is false, therefore, that the generation of the body of the
universe is a motion.
Regarding thesecond alternative, namely, thesupposition thatthebody
of the universe is eternal, al-Kindi contends that if this were the case and
the body of the universe were to subsequently move (because it had the
possibility of motion), then it would be a movement from a state of actual
rest to a state of actual motion. This is a change.37 But the eternal cannot
change; change isamovement from deficiency toperfection, butthe eternal
isnecessarily perfect, and that which isperfect exists ina fully actual state
"whereby it excels."38 Accordingly, the eternal does not move. But, by
hypothesis, the bodyof the universe is eternal anddoesmove. The eternal,
therefore, both moves and does not move. Again, this iscontradictory. Hence,
it follows that body cannot exist without motion.
The upshot ofall this isthat al-Kindi has provided two major arguments
fortheconclusion thatit is necessary thatif body exists, motion exists. As
mentioned earlier, this isacritical premise inhis overall argument. Having
established that Q(MdB) and now that • (B z> M), al-Kindi can justifiably
assert that• (B = M), that body andmotion are necessary concomitants.
Nowgiventhatmotion andtimearealsonecessary concomitants, it follows
logically and inescapably thatbody andtime arenecessary concomitants:
• (B=T). Recall that al-Kindi's proof forcreation began with anargument
for the finitude of the body of the universe. Furthermore, the claim was
made that time is the duration of the body of the universe, and therefore
that if the body of the universe is finite, time is finite as well. It was noted
thatthiswould betrueonlyif body andtime werenecessary concomitants.
The proof for this claim(defective though it may be) is now in. Al-Kindi
therefore concludes that since (i) the body of the universe is finite, (ii) time
36 William Craig offers the following definition ofa thing's beginning to exist: '"x begins
toexist' = def. 'x exists at t and there is notime immediately priorto t at which x exists'."
See William Lane Craig, "The Origin and Creation of the Universe: A Reply toAdolph
GrUnbaum," British Journalfor the Philosophy ofScience 43 (1992): 238.
37 Al-Kindi, "On First Philosophy," 114.1 ff, pp. 67-68.
38 Ibid., 114.6-7, p.68.
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is the duration of the body of the universe, and (iii) body and time are
necessaryconcomitants, the body of the universe is spatiallyand temporally
finite. In other words, the universe is not eternal; it began to exist a finite
time ago.
VI.
Even so, it does not immediately follow that the body of the universe is
created. After all, perhaps the need for a Creator of the universe can be
averted by holding that the universe is self-caused. In order to eliminate
this possibility, Al-Kindi posits the following logically exhaustive
disjunction:
(13) For any thing T and its essence E either
(a) ~(T exists) & ~(E exists)
or
(b) ~(T exists) & E exists
or
(c) T exists & ~(E exists)
or
(d) T exists & E exists.
Now the question at hand is: Can a thing "be the cause of the generation of
its essence,"39 that is, the cause of "its becoming a being, either from
something or nothing?"40 Clearly, since al-Kindi understands the "essence
ofevery thing [to be] that thing,"41 we should see him as inquiring whether
a thing can bring itself into existence. The answer, al-Kindi affirms, is that
it cannot. For consider each of the alternatives (13 a-d). If (13a) were true,
then in order for a thing to be the cause of its existence it would have to
exist (since ex nihil, nihil fit).42 But (13a) says that the thing in question
39Al-Kindi, "On First Philosophy," 123.5, p. 76.
40 Ibid.
4> Ibid., 124.12, p. 77.
42Onecontemporary philosopher whohasnotshiedawayfromaffirming thatbeing
can arise uncaused out of absolute nothingness is Quentin Smith. According to Smith,
"the most reasonable belief is that we came from nothing, by nothing and for nothing"
(William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, Theism,Atheism,and Big Bang Cosmology
[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993], p. 135).
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does not exist. So it exists and it does not exist. It would therefore be
impossible for a thing to be the cause of its own existence if (13a) were
true. Similarly, then, for (13b). This alternative states that the thing does
notexistbut its essence does. This is contradictory; theessence of a thing
is that thing. So if the thing did not exist, then it could not be the cause of its
existence (since out of nothing, nothing comes). (13c) fails for precisely
the same reasons. The last alternative to be considered is (13d). If (13d)
were true, then a thing would have to be the cause of its essence, the essence
being an effect following from the thing. Butthis is absurd; a thing and its
essence are the same thing, whereas a cause and its effect are distinct.
Consequently, if (13d) weretrue, a thingcouldnot be the cause of its own
existence.
There are only four alternatives with respect tothe relationship between
athingandits essence. Undereachofthese scenarios, however, it turnsout
that it is impossible for a thing to be the cause of its existence. Al-Kindi's
conclusionon this point is, I think, quite correct:
(14) It is impossible that anything be the cause of its
own existence.
And from (14) it follows quiteappropriately that
(15) It is impossible that the body of the universe be
the cause of its own existence.
The inference to creation and, therefore, to a Creator is close at hand. Given
that the universe began to exist in the finite past, there seem to be three
alternatives with regard to its comingto haveexisted. Either it cameto be
out of nothing (which is absurd), or it causeditself to exist (which has also
been shown to be absurd), or it was created. Since the first two alternatives
are impossible, the inference to the universe's being created by a Creator
(i.e., God) seems entirely justified.
VII.
By way of conclusion, then, it is clear that al-Kindi's philosophical
doctrine of creation depends onhisarguments for the bodyof the universe
beginning to exist at some point in the finite past. Starting from six self-
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evident principles, al-Kindi is able to show (successfully, I think) that no
body of actually infinite magnitude can exist, and thus that the body ofthe
universe cannot be infinite. But his claim that the universe is, in addition,
temporally finite, given that time is the duration of the body of the universe,
was seen to follow only if body and time are necessary concomitants. The
crucial premise required to prove this was that body cannot exist without
motion.Unfortunately,the two supportingarguments for thispremise were
found to be flawed in various respects. It seems to me, therefore, that al-
Kindi's argument for the necessary concomitance of body and time, and
therefore the inference to the temporal finitude of the universe (and
ultimately its creation by God), is not justified. This is not to say, however,
that al-Kindi has failed altogether to show that the universe began to exist
at some point in the finite past. For he has at his disposal two other arguments
for this conclusion: an argument from composition and an argument based
on the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite; both of these seem
very promising. Moreover, there is no reason to think that the argument
based on body, motion, and time could not be revised so as to provide us
with the desired conclusion. The door has not been shut on the Kindian
arguments for the creation of the universe and the existence of a Creator;
al-Kindi's efforts in this regard certainly warrant the critical attention of
contemporary philosophers interested in these and related matters.
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